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TOWARD RATIONAL REGULATION OF GENETICALLY
MODIFIED FOOD*
Gregory N. Mandel**

I. CURRENT REGULATION OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED PLANTS AND
ANIMALS
A. The Coordinated Framework
As the biotechnology industry developed in the early 1980s, it was
recognized that regulation was necessary to protect human health and the
environment from the potential deleterious effects of transgenic products.
This recognition culminated in the promulgation of the federal government's
Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology by the White
House Office of Science and Technology Policy in 1986.1 The Coordinated
Framework instituted a “comprehensive federal regulatory policy for ...
biotechnology research and products.”2 It specified that bioengineered
products generally would be regulated under what was the then-existing
statutory and regulatory structure.3 The foundation for this decision was a
determination that the process of biotechnology was not inherently risky, and
therefore, only the products of biotechnology, not the process itself, required
* © 2005 Gregory N. Mandel. All rights reserved.
** Associate Professor of Law, Albany Law School. These materials are excerpted, with
some modifications, from Gregory N. Mandel, Gaps, Inexperience, Inconsistencies, and
Overlaps: Crisis in the Regulation of Genetically Modified Plants and Animals, 45 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 2167 (2004). Please refer to the Gaps article for a fuller discussion of
the issues addressed here.
1

Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 (June
26, 1986).
2

Id. at 23,302.

3

Id. at 23,302-08, 23,309, 23,313-14, 23,336.
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oversight. On this basis, the Coordinated Framework established that existing
laws and regulations were sufficient to handle the products of
biotechnology.4 This decision was based in part on a desire not to impose
regulations that could hamper the development of a promising and fledgling
industry.5
As a result of the Coordinated Framework, genetically modified
products are regulated by three administrative agencies: the FDA, the EPA,
and the USDA. These three administrative agencies are involved in the
regulation of the genetically modified products discussed in this paper: The
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is responsible for food safety issues
for transgenic crop and food-animal varieties, in addition to drug safety
issues for modified pharmaceutical-producing plants or animals; the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) handles health and environmental
effects of pest-protected plants; and the United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA) regulates the effect of genetically modified plants on
other plants and animals in both agricultural and nonagricultural
environments.6 Because the Coordinated Framework would result in multiple
agencies acting in closely related areas, two basic principles were delineated
in order to guide regulatory policy. First, “[a]gencies should seek to adopt
consistent definitions of those genetically engineered organisms subject to
review to the extent permitted by their respective statutory authorities.”7

4

Id. at 23,302-03; see NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, GENETICALLY MODIFIED PESTPROTECTED PLANTS: SCIENCE AND REGULATION 25-26 (2000) [hereinafter NRC 2000
REPORT].
5

Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23,302-03.

6

See Nat’l Research Council, Environmental Effects of Transgenic Plants 19 (2002)
[hereinafter NRC 2002 Report].

7

Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23,303.
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Second, the “agencies should utilize scientific reviews of comparable rigor.”8
With the Coordinated Framework in place, the regulation of biotechnology
was left to the administrative agencies.
B. The Food and Drug Administration
The FDA is responsible for insuring that all food products on the
market in the United States, other than meat and poultry, are safe. In
furtherance of this goal, the FDA provides voluntary premarket consultations
with food companies, seed companies, and plant developers regarding the
safety of transgenic foods.
The FDA’s statutory authority is the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetics Act (FFDCA), enacted in 1938.9 No statutory provisions or FDA
regulations expressly cover genetically modified foods. Pursuant to FDA
regulations, plants modified through modern rDNA techniques are not treated
any differently from conventionally modified plants.10
Section 402(a)(1) of the FFDCA authorizes the FDA to regulate
“adulterated foods,” which is food that “bears or contains any poisonous or
deleterious substance which may render it injurious to health.”11 In addition,
section 409 of the FFDCA provides for the regulation of “food additives,”
which are substances that are intended for use in food, that may reasonably
be expected to become a component of food, or that otherwise may affect the
8

Id.

9

See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2003).

10

Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984
(May 29, 1992).
11

21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(1) (1994). “Food” is defined as “(1) articles used for food or drink
for man or other animals, (2) chewing gum, and (3) articles used for components of any
such article.” Id. § 321(f). This includes human food, animal food, pet food, and
substances migrating to food from food-contact articles. 21 C.F.R. § 170.3(m) (2003).
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characteristics of food.12 A food additive must be approved by the FDA prior
to being used in a food product.

13

Manufacturers, however, do not need

approval for a food additive if such substance is generally recognized as safe
(GRAS) by experts.14
Thus, both the inserted gene of a transgenic plant and the product that
it expresses are food additives, unless they are GRAS.15 With respect to
genetically modified foods, the FDA has determined that “[i]n most cases,
the substances expected to become components of food as a result of genetic
modification of a plant will be the same as or substantially similar to
substances commonly found in food, such as proteins, fats and oils, and
carbohydrates,” and therefore will be GRAS.16
The food additive manufacturer, not the FDA, determines whether a
food additive is GRAS.17 A manufacturer does not need to report to the FDA
that it has made a GRAS determination, but it may do so and may receive
from the FDA an affirmation that the particular substance is GRAS.18 Thus,
the FDA’s regulatory requirements with respect to genetically modified food
are primarily voluntary. This decision was explicitly made by the FDA based
on its determination that “[a]ny genetic modification technique has the
12

21 U.S.C. §§ 321(s), 348 (1994).

13

Id. § 348.
Id. § 321(s).

14
15

Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. at 22,990.

16

Id. at 22,985. The primary exceptions, where foods would require special review,
would be where the gene transfer produces unexpected genetic results, may cause allergic
reactions, significantly increases the level of toxicants, or changes the nutrient
composition of the food. Id. at 22,993 fig.1.

17

Id. at 22,989.

18

21 C.F.R. § 170.35 (2003). Such a determination will protect the product from
enforcement actions. Id.

24
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potential to alter the composition of food in a manner relevant to food safety,
although, based on experience, the likelihood of a safety hazard is typically
very low.”19

In 1995, the FDA conducted a safety review of the first

genetically modified food product to be commercialized, the Flavr Savr
tomato.20 This review was conducted at the request of the manufacturer, who
was attempting to build public confidence.21 Since that time, the FDA has not
conducted a safety review of any of the scores of other genetically modified
food products that have been commercialized; however, the FDA believes
that manufacturers have voluntarily consulted with it regarding each of these
products.22
The FDA does not require that genetically modified foods be labeled
as such. The basis for this determination is the FDA’s conclusion that
19

Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. at 22,986.
A challenge to the FDA’s decision not to regulate genetically modified food differently
from conventional food was dismissed. Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp.
2d 166 (D.D.C. 2000).
On January 18, 2001, the FDA published proposed revised regulations for genetically
engineered food. Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. 4706
(Jan. 18, 2001) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 192, 592). These regulations would
require manufacturers and importers to provide the FDA with premarket notification of
their intent to market genetically modified foods that have not been subject to a previous
premarket notification. Id. at 4707. These proposals, promulgated days before President
George W. Bush took office, have not been finalized or acted upon since that time.
20

See John Henkel, Genetic Engineering: Fast Forwarding to Future Foods, FDA
Consumer, April 1995, available at
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/CONSUMER/geneng.html.
21
22

Id.

Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. at 4708; NRC 2000
Report, supra note 2, at 29; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., FDA
To Strengthen Premarket Review of Bioengineered Foods (May 3, 2000), available at
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/NEW00726.html. The FDA has been consulted on
more than fifty bioengineered plants. Office of Food Additive Safety, FDA List of
Completed Consultations on Bioengineered Foods, http://www.
cfsan.fda.gov/~lrd/biocon.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2005). The FDA has not required
any of the transgenic plants, or their expression products, to be reviewed as food
additives. NRC 2000 Report, supra note 4, at 29.
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genetically modified products do not differ materially from, or create greater
safety concerns than, their conventional counterparts.23 To the extent that
there are significant safety concerns or usage issues, such as substantial
changes in composition or nutritive value, the FDA requires labeling.24
The FDA explicitly has waived its regulatory authority over
genetically modified pest-protected plants, so long as the plants have not also
been modified to express other nonpesticidal proteins.25 These plants are
regulated by the EPA as pesticides, and are discussed below.26
The FDA asserts regulatory authority over genetically modified fish
and other animals pursuant to the “new animal drug” provisions of the
FFDCA.27 These provisions allow the FDA to evaluate the new animal
drug’s safety with “reference to the health of man or animal,”28 which is
interpreted to include environmental effects that impact the health of humans

23

Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. at 22,991.

24

Id. In Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166 (D.D.C. 2000), the
court upheld the FDA’s decision not to require labeling based on consumer interest. Id. at
181. Proponents of genetically modified food labeling point out an apparent inconsistency
in FDA regulations, as the FDA does require labeling based on processing differences
and consumer interest in certain other areas. Examples include labeling requirements for
juice made from concentrate and for food that has been frozen. See 21 C.F.R. § 102.33
(2003) (labeling requirements for juice from concentrate); 9 C.F.R. § 381.129 (2003)
(labeling requirements for previously frozen poultry).

25

Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. at 23,005.

26

See infra Part I.C; Exemption from the Requirement of a Tolerance Under the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act for Residues Derived Through Conventional Breeding
from Sexually Compatible Plants of Plant-Incorporated Protectants (Formerly PlantPesticides), 66 Fed. Reg. 37,830, 37,835 (July 19, 2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
174); see also Regulations Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
for Plant-Incorporated Protectants (Formerly Plant-Pesticides), 66 Fed. Reg. 37,772,
37,775 (July 19, 2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 152, 174) (EPA regulations for
pest-protected plants).
27

See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.

28

21 U.S.C. § 321(u) (1994).

26
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or animals other than those intended to receive the new drug.29
The FDA has regulatory authority over pharmaceuticals grown in
genetically modified plants that are intended for use in humans pursuant to
the Public Health Service Act30 and the FFDCA. A full discussion of FDA
regulations governing the approval of pharmaceuticals for human use is
beyond the scope of these comments. It is sufficient to note that FDA
regulations are similar to those governing transgenic plants used for food. In
both cases, the FDA regulates the use of plants that might express an
allergenic or toxic compound in the pharmaceutical, and protects against the
introduction of nonfood material into food or feed.31 The FDA regulations
governing human drugs, biologics, and animal drugs do not specifically
address biotechnology.32 The USDA shares regulatory authority over the
growth of the genetically engineered pharmaceutical-producing plants, as
discussed below.33
C. The Environmental Protection Agency
The EPA regulates genetically modified products through its
authority to regulate pesticide use and pesticide residue in food products. All
pesticides must be registered with the EPA prior to their distribution, sale, or
use, pursuant to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and the Rodenticide Act

29

Council on Envtl. Quality & Office of Sci. & Tech. Policy, Case Study No. I: GrowthEnhanced Salmon 14 (2001) [hereinafter Case Study No. I: Growth-Enhanced Salmon],
available at http://www.ostp.gov/html/ceq_ostp_ study2.pdf.
30

42 U.S.C. § 262-262(a) (2003).

31

See Ctr. for Biologics Evaluation and Research, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., U.S.
Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., FDA Guidance for Industry: Drugs, Biologics, and
Medical Devices Derived from Bioengineered Plants for Use in Humans and Animals
(Draft Guidance) (2002), available at http://www.fda.gov/cber/gdlns/bioplant.htm.

32

See Nat’l Research Council, Animal Biotechnology: Science-Based Concerns 164
(2002) [hereinafter Animal Biotechnology].

33

See infra Part I.D.
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(FIFRA) of 1947.34 “Pesticide” is defined under FIFRA to include any
substance “intended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating any
pest.”35 To register a pesticide, one must demonstrate that the pesticide will
not cause “unreasonable adverse risk to man or to the environment.”36 The
EPA has authority to exempt pesticides from registration requirements if it
determines them “to be of a character which is unnecessary to be subject to
[FIFRA] in order to carry out the purposes of [FIFRA].”37
FIFRA was enacted to regulate chemical substances, not
biotechnological products (it was enacted prior to Watson and Crick’s
discovery of the DNA molecule). Based on FIFRA’s statutory definition of
“pesticide,” however, the EPA regulates the genetic material inserted into
transgenic plants to express pesticidal products, as well as the expression

34

7 U.S.C. § 136-136(a) (1994). The EPA has the authority to regulate chemical
substances under the TSCA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1994), but has determined that
transgenic plants are not chemical substances. Statement of Policy, Microbial Products
Subject to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act and the Toxic
Substances Control Act, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,313, 23,324 (June 26, 1986). The EPA regulates
genetically modified microorganisms pursuant to TSCA, defining microorganisms as
chemical substances. 40 C.F.R. § 725.8(c)(1) (2001).
35

7 U.S.C. § 136(u) (1994).

36

Id. § 136(a)(c)(8).

37

Id. § 136(w)(b). The EPA will exempt pesticides where there is “a low probability of
risk to the environment, and [it] is not likely to cause unreasonable adverse effects [on]
the environment even in the absence of regulatory oversight under FIFRA.” Regulations
Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act for Plant-Incorporated
Protectants (Formerly Plant-Pesticides), 66 Fed. Reg. 37,773 (July 19, 2001) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 152, 174). The EPA has exempted pest-protected plants that are
derived through conventional breeding processes from pesticide registration
requirements. Exemption from the Requirement of a Tolerance Under the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act for Residues Derived Through Conventional Breeding from
Sexually Compatible Plants of Plant-Incorporated Protectants (Formerly PlantPesticides), 66 Fed. Reg. 37,835 (July 19, 2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 174). The
EPA also has used this exemption process to exempt from the FFDCA tolerance
requirements “residues of nucleic acids that are part of a plant-incorporated protectant.”
Exemption from the Requirement for a Tolerance Under the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act for Residues of Nucleic Acids That are Part of Plant-Incorporated

28
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products themselves, as pesticides.38 Thus, manufacturers of transgenic pestprotected plants must receive registration of the plants from the EPA prior to
commercialization. Certain congressional members and professional societies
have contended that the EPA does not have authority to regulate transgenic
pest-protected plants as pesticides under FIFRA, but the regulations have not
been challenged in court.39
In 1988, just prior to the widespread development of genetically
engineered pest-protected plants, the EPA exempted plants and
microorganisms with pesticidal properties from the requirements of FIFRA.40
This exemption was intended for plants, such as chrysanthemums, that are
naturally pest-protected.41 Due to these regulations, the EPA does not
regulate any plants themselves, including genetically modified ones.42 As
discussed above, the EPA does regulate the inserted genetic material and the
products it expresses.
The EPA is responsible for regulating both the environmental and
human health impacts of plants genetically modified to produce their own
Protectants (Formerly Plant-Pesticides), 66 Fed. Reg. 37,817, 37,820 (July 19, 2001).
38

Regulations Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act for
Plant-Incorporated Protectants (Formerly Plant-Pesticides), 66 Fed. Reg. at 37,772-73.

39

NRC 2000 Report, supra note 4, at 38. In addition, they have raised concerns that the
EPA regulation lacks “formal cost-benefit analysis,” that it “could damage the
[technological] progress ... by overburdening small biotechnology companies and public
breeding programs,” and could undermine “[public] confidence in the food supply.” Id.
Regarding the first issue, the lack of formal cost-benefit analysis, it is worth noting that
the registration decision takes into account the “economic, social, and environmental
costs and benefits” of the pesticide. 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb) (1994).
40

40 C.F.R. § 152.20a (2001); see Pesticide Registration Procedures, Pesticide Data
Requirements, 53 Fed. Reg. 15,952, 15,975 (May 4, 1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pts. 152-53, 156, 158, 162).
41
42

NRC 2000 Report, supra note 4, at 150.

See 40 C.F.R. § 152.20a (2001); Regulations Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act for Plant-Incorporated Protectants (Formerly Plant-Pesticides), 66
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pesticides as the FDA has ceded regulatory authority over pest-protected
plants to the EPA.43 Where use of a pesticide will result in any residue being
left on food, the pesticide is subject to regulation by the EPA pursuant to the
FFDCA. In these instances, the EPA establishes “tolerance” levels for the
allowable amount of pesticide residue that can be left on food products.44
Currently, all FIFRA-registered pest-protected plants are exempt from
tolerance level requirements because tests of these transgenic plants have not
revealed a human health risk.45
The EPA does not regulate genetically engineered plants other than
those modified to contain pesticides,46 and it does not regulate the
environmental impacts or potential impacts of genetically engineered
animals.
D. The U.S. Department of Agriculture
The USDA is responsible for protecting and promoting American
agriculture. Based on the principle that genetically modified plants could
pose a risk to agricultural crops, the USDA oversees the agricultural safety of
the movement, importation, and field testing of transgenic plants.
In order to grow transgenic plants outside of a laboratory, approval
must be obtained from the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
(APHIS) of the USDA. APHIS’s authority to regulate genetically modified
plants stems from the Plant Protection Act (PPA).47 The PPA was enacted in
Fed. Reg. at 37,774.
43

See 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb) (1994). The registration process requires submission of
information on the potential beneficial or adverse effects of the pesticide on human health
and the environment. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(2) (1994).

44
45

21 U.S.C. § 346a (1994).
See 40 C.F.R. § 180.1155 (2001).

46

For example, it does not regulate herbicide-resistant or disease-resistant plants.

47

Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7772 (2003).

30
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2000, and thus, at first glance, appears to deviate from the trend of regulating
biotechnology under ancient statutes. The PPA, however, essentially
consolidated authority from two previous statutes that APHIS had used to
regulate genetically modified organisms: the Federal Plant Pest Act
(FPPA),48 enacted in 1957, and the Federal Plant Quarantine Act (PQA),49
enacted in 1912. Both the FPPA and PQA were originally enacted to regulate
the introduction of non-indigenous plant species.50 APHIS regulations
governing genetically modified plants under the PPA are simply those
established pursuant to the FPPA and the PQA.51 No modification to
APHIS’s regulation of biotechnology products has been made pursuant to the
PPA.52
In accordance with the PPA, APHIS has primary regulatory authority
for all genetically modified plants except pest-protected ones.53 As APHIS is
supposed to carry out its mandate while not impeding the growth of the

48

7 U.S.C. § 150aa-jj (1994).

49

7 U.S.C. §§ 151-164, 166-167 (1994).

50

See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302,
23,342-43 (June 26, 1986).
51
See Plant Protection Act, Revisions to Authority Citations, 66 Fed. Reg. 21,049 (Apr.
27, 2001) (revising the genetically modified plant regulations to change authority
citations to the PPA without substantively changing the regulations); Michael R. Taylor
& Jody S. Tick, Post-Market Oversight of Biotech Foods: Is the System Prepared? 25
(2003). The PPA was enacted as part of the Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000,
pursuant to H.R. 2559. There was no Senate or House debate on the PPA portions of H.R.
2559, and there is little legislative history to indicate what Congress’ intent was with
respect to genetically modified plants when it passed the PPA.
52

Where APHIS has promulgated new regulations subsequent to the enactment of the
PPA, such regulations have not differed “from what [APHIS] would have proposed under
the authority of th[e] applicable provisions of law that were repealed by the Plant
Protection Act.” Plant Pest Regulations, Update of Current Provisions, 66 Fed. Reg.
51,340 (Oct. 9, 2001); see Taylor & Tick, supra note 51, at 25.
53

NRC 2002 Report, supra note 6, at 101.
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biotechnology industry,54 critics have contended that an agency charged with
promoting agriculture (including the biotechnology industry), “may not be
able to objectively assess the safety of new products of agricultural
biotechnology.”55
Under the PPA, anyone seeking to introduce (i.e., import, transport
interstate, or release into the environment)56 a regulated article must receive
authorization from APHIS.57 “Regulated article” includes,
[a]ny organism which has been altered or
produced through genetic engineering, if the
donor organism, recipient organism, or vector
or vector agent belongs to any genera or taxa
designated in § 340.2 [a list of known plant
pests] and meets the definition of plant pest,
or is an unclassified organism and/or an
organism whose classification is unknown, or
any product which contains such an organism,
or any other organism or product altered or
produced through genetic engineering which
[APHIS] determines is a plant pest....58
A “plant pest” includes a wide variety of organisms “which can
directly or indirectly injure or cause disease or damage in or to any plants or
parts thereof ....”59 This definition is very broad; any species that interacts

54

Id. at 49.

55

Id. at 19.

56

“Environmental release” is the use of a regulated article outside the physical constraints
of a laboratory, contained greenhouse, or other contained structure. 7 C.F.R. § 340.1
(2003).
57

Id. § 340.

58

Id. § 340.1. Note that this definition is explicitly based on the organism’s having been
developed through genetic engineering; i.e., it regulates based on the process by which
the article was produced, not based on the product. One result of the taxonomic list
restriction is that vertebrates cannot be considered plant pests. Id. § 340.2.

32
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ecologically with a plant could likely be considered to indirectly injure or
damage it.60
Prior to conducting a field trial of a new transgenic plant, a developer
must perform a risk evaluation on the plant to determine whether the plant
may be a plant pest. No consideration of any other risks, such as other human
health or environmental risks, must be evaluated prior to the field test.61
Authorization from APHIS can come via a notification or permitting
process, each of which is aimed at ensuring that the transgenic organisms are
grown and handled in a manner to prevent their escape into the environment.
For most genetically modified plants, under certain conditions, simple
notification of APHIS prior to release (without the requirement of receiving a
permit) is sufficient.62 Nearly 99% of all field tests, importations, and
interstate movement of genetically engineered plants take place under the
notification system.63
Permits are required for the movement, importation, and field testing
of transgenic plants that do not qualify for notification and for plants denied
59

Id. § 340.1.

60

Id.

61

Id. § 340.
Id. § 340.3. The notification process applies to a specified list of plants and
characteristics. Requirements include: confinement; that the plant not be listed as a
noxious weed or considered a weed in the area of release; that the inserted gene be stably
integrated; that the function of the inserted gene be known; that the inserted gene’s
expression not result in plant disease; that the inserted gene be derived from human or
animal viral pathogens; and that the inserted gene does not cause the production of an
infectious entity, encode for substances likely to be toxic to nontarget species or to feed
on the plant, or encode for products intended for pharmaceutical use. NRC 2002 Report,
supra note 6, at 108-09.
The applicant must notify APHIS of its intent to release a regulated article.
APHIS staff reviews the notification for qualification and completeness, and then sends a
recommendation to state officials for concurrence. The entire process must be completed
in ten days for interstate movement, and thirty days otherwise. 7 C.F.R. § 304.3 (2001).
63
Council on Envtl. Quality & Office of Sci. & Tech. Policy, Case Study No. III:
Herbicide-Tolerant Soybean 4 (2001) [hereinafter Case Study No. III: Herbicide-Tolerant
Soybean], available at http://www.ostp.gov/html/ceq_ostp_study4.pdf.
62
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notification.64 APHIS uses the permitting process to evaluate potential plant
pest risk and to require prevention measures to reduce risk.65 The primary
emphasis of the permitting process is confinement.66
An applicant can petition APHIS to determine that a certain
genetically modified plant is not a plant pest (essentially that the regulated
article is free from the risks outlined above), and therefore should be given
“nonregulated status.”67 Plants granted nonregulated status, as well as their
progeny, are no longer subject to any APHIS oversight—they may be freely
planted, transported, and sold.68 This process is the sole manner in which
transgenic plants can be commercialized, and the primary, though not sole,
route through which the products of transgenic plants can be commercialized
(e.g., sale of an industrial protein derived from a plant).69
APHIS regulates transgenic pharmaceutical-producing plants
pursuant to the same authority under which it regulates other transgenic
plants, such as “regulated articles” under the PPA.70 Thus, applicants must
acquire a permit prior to the field test of transgenic pharmaceutical-producing
plants, as such plants are specifically excluded from the notification

64

NRC 2002 Report, supra note 6, at 110.

65

Id.

66

Id.

67

7 C.F.R. § 340.6 (2001).

68

Id. Prior to receiving nonregulated status, APHIS must conduct an Environmental
Assessment pursuant to NEPA. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2000); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1508 (2002).

69

NRC 2002 Report, supra note 6, at 111. “[C]ommercial products have also been
created from regulated transgenic [plants].” Id. at 120. APHIS has deregulated many
genetically modified crops. APHIS maintains a list of the deregulated plants, as well as
pending deregulation petitions. APHIS, Petitions of Nonregulated Status granted or
pending by Aphis, http://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/not_reg.html (last visited Sept. 18,
2005).
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process.71 Various measures must then be taken to confine the transgenic
plants to the field site during the period of release, and to prevent the plants
or their offspring from persisting in the environment subsequently.72
With respect to biotechnology developments beyond plants, the Food
Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) of the USDA is responsible for the
safety of food products prepared from domestic livestock and poultry.73 The
Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) and the Poultry Products Inspection Act
(PPIA) require FSIS to inspect cattle, sheep, swine, goats, equines, poultry,
and food products prepared from them, which are intended for use as human
food.74 Pursuant to these acts, the FSIS has regulatory authority over
genetically modified domestic livestock and poultry.
APHIS also has regulatory authority over the release of insects for
pest management,75 and presumably would regulate the release of transgenic
insects in the same manner. No agency regulates research and
commercialization of transgenic insects other than for their intentional
release, and no guidelines exist that govern their containment or the potential
70

7 C.F.R. § 340 (2001).

71

Id. § 340.4.

72

Id. § 340.3. Earlier regulations required that the pharmaceutical-producing plants be
isolated by a 1320 foot buffer from other plants in order to prevent cross-pollination, a
distance twice that used to assure purity of their seeds. Andrew Pollack, New Ventures
Aim to Put Farms in Vanguard of Farm Production, N.Y. Times, May 14, 2000, at A1; 7
C.F.R. § 201.76 (2003); Regulations proposed by APHIS would increase the buffer zone
to one-half to one mile depending on certain factors. Field Testing of Plants Engineered
To Produce Pharmaceutical and Industrial Compounds, 68 Fed. Reg. 11,337, 11,338
(Mar. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 340).
Other protective techniques are being developed. These include implanting a
gene to turn the pharmaceutical-producing plant a different color and harvesting the
pharmaceutical-producing plants before sexual maturity. Pollack, supra, at A1.
73

See 9 C.F.R. §§ 300.1, 300.2, 300.3 (2003) (establishing the FSIS within the USDA);
21 U.S.C. §§ 451, 601, 1031 (2003) (granting the FSIS administrator the authority to
regulate the safety of domestic livestock, poultry, and poultry products).
74
21 U.S.C. §§ 451, 601, 1031 (2003).
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ecological risks posed by their release.76
As evidenced by the preceding analysis, the statutory structure under
which biotechnological products are regulated in the United States is based
on legislation enacted decades ago, long before transgenic products were
scientifically conceivable. As a result of dated statutes, and decisions made in
the Coordinated Framework and thereafter, the regulations governing
genetically modified products have been developed in a piecemeal,
haphazard manner. Genetically modified plants and animals are now
governed by as many as twelve different statutes and five different agencies
or services.77

75

7 U.S.C. § 7701 (2003); 7 C.F.R. §§ 2.3, 2.22, 2.80(a)(51) (2003).

76

Animal Biotechnology, supra note 32, at 21, 88-89, 114. For a discussion of how
certain existing statutes could be applied to transgenic insects, see The Pew Initiative on
Food & Biotechnology, Bugs in the System?: Issues in the Science and Regulation of
Genetically Modified Insects (2004) [hereinafter Bugs in the System], available at
http://pewagbiotech.org/research/bugs/bugs.pdf.
77

See Table 1 infra Part I.D.
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Table 1. Regulatory Authority over Transgenic Plants and Animals.78
USE

STATUTE

AGENCY

Food and food additives
Meat, poultry, egg products
Pesticide residues

FFDCA
FMIA,79 PPIA,80 EPIA81
FFDCA

FDA
FSIS
EPA

Production of pharmaceuticals
Human drugs
Human biologics
Animal drugs
Animal biologics

FFDCA
PHS Act,82 FFDCA
FFDCA
AQL,83 VSTA84

FDA
FDA
FDA
APHIS

Production of pesticidal
substances in plants

FIFRA
PPA

EPA
APHIS

Production of plant herbicidePPA
tolerance FIFRA
Herbicide usage on plants

APHIS
EPA

Biocontrol of plants

PPA
FIFRA

APHIS
EPA

Biocontrol of plant pests

PPA
FIFRA

APHIS
EPA

Biomedical research on animals

AWA85
HREA86

APHIS
NIH87

78

Animal Biotechnology, supra note 32, at 162-64; Council on Envtl. Quality & Office
of Sci. & Tech. Policy, CEQ and OSTP Assessment: Case Studies of Environmental
Regulations for Biotechnology 6 (2001) [hereinafter CEQ and OSTP Assessment],
available at http://www.ostp.gov/html/ceq_ostp_study1.pdf. This Table lists the common
uses of genetically modified plant and animal products, the statutes under which they are
regulated, and the regulating agency under each statute. A careful reader will note that
this Table lists only eleven statutes. As discussed elsewhere in these comments, the
AHPA (enacted in 2002) may represent the twelfth statutory authority concerning
genetically modified plants and animals. See infra note 101.
79

Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-691 (2003).

80

Poultry Products Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 451-471 (2003).

81

Egg Products Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 1031-1056 (2003).

82

Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 262, 264 (2003).

83

Animal Quarantine Laws, 21 U.S.C. §§ 101-135 (2003).

84

Virus, Serums, and Toxins Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 151-159 (2003).

85

Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (2003).

86

Health Research Extension Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201-300gg-92 (2003).
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The multiplicity of statutes and agencies regulating biotechnology has
created confusion among the regulated industry and the public, reduced
clarity regarding scientific standards and requirements, and has retarded the
efficiency of biotechnology development and regulation. Not surprisingly,
this fractured approach to regulation has led to numerous problems. These
regulatory problems are discussed and categorized in the following section.
II. REGULATORY GAPS, INCONSISTENCIES, INEXPERIENCE, AND
OVERLAPS
The statutory and regulatory regime for genetically modified products
described in the preceding section only partially reveals how these products
are actually regulated in practice. The quality of transgenic product
regulation is affected by issues of agency financial and personnel resources,
agency priorities, agency decision making structures, the quality of and
reliance on in-house and third-party research, agency capture, political
pressure, in addition to other factors. This section analyzes deficiencies that
exist in the regulation of genetically modified products.
In order to better understand these deficiencies, and to work towards
their cure, it is useful to categorize them. The following four categories cover
most of the regulatory problems concerning transgenic products identified
here: gaps in regulation or regulatory authority; overlaps in regulation or
regulatory authority; inconsistencies among agencies in their regulation of
similarly situated or identical products; and instances of agencies acting
outside their areas of expertise.
Gaps are a problem because of the potential for harm to human health
or the environment. Overlaps cause a dead-weight loss on multiple fronts: for
the regulated industry which has to fulfill duplicative requirements, for
87

National Institutes of Health.
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government and the taxpayers who pay beyond the necessary cost of
regulation, and for society for whom the development and commercialization
of transgenic products is inefficiently delayed. Inconsistencies are not only
irrational, but they also create a dead-weight loss for industry trying to
comply with the regulations and they may delay the development of valuable
products. Lastly, instances of agencies acting outside their areas of expertise
are inefficient and unreasonably increase the risk posed to society by
genetically modified products. Each of these categories of deficiencies is
discussed in turn.
A. Regulatory Gaps
1. Gaps in Environmental Review
The most striking incidence of regulatory gaps with regard to
genetically modified products is the lack of EPA involvement in the review
and approval of numerous products that could have a significant impact on
the environment. The most significant risks posed by the introduction of
genetically modified fish, for instance, are likely environmental. The EPA,
however, has determined that it does not have regulatory authority over these
products. The EPA also has no role in the approval or field-testing and
widespread planting of genetically modified plants other than those modified
to be pest-protected. Thus, the EPA is not evaluating the potential impact of
transgenic pharmaceutical-producing, industrial compound-producing,
herbicide-tolerant,

drought-tolerant,

salinity-tolerant,

virus-resistant,

temperature-tolerant, or disease-resistant plants on the environment.
Since the majority of types of genetically modified plants are not
subject to environmental evaluation by the agency charged with protecting
the nation’s environment, there is the potential for unsafe products
permeating the market. APHIS does not conduct environmental assessments
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of transgenic plants submitted through the notification process,88 which is
currently the dominant route for the field-testing of new genetically
engineered plants.89
Perhaps most troubling is the insufficiency of the environmental
testing that APHIS engages. The National Research Council recently
criticized certain APHIS environmental risk assessments for “lack[ing]
scientific rigor, balance, and transparency,”90 for containing an analysis that
was “weak and inconsistent,”91 for failing to evaluate potential impacts on
nontarget organisms, for failing to consider the interactions between multiple
transgenic traits, and for failing to utilize all available scientific data and
information.92 APHIS also has been criticized for “relying too heavily on
existing scientific literature rather than requiring applicants [for notification]
to develop new experimental data” relevant to the risks posed by the
pertinent genetically modified plants being reviewed.93 The EPA, with
numerous experts trained in and routinely performing environmental risk

88

NRC 2002 Report, supra note 6, at 123. APHIS assumes genetically modified plants
released into the environment pursuant to the notification process to be environmentally
safe based upon the notification criteria and efforts required to minimize the chance of
escape in the field. Id.
89

See supra text accompanying note 63.

90

NRC 2002 Report, supra note 6, at 148.

91

Id. at 149.

92

Id. at 148-53, 160-66, 235. These criticisms were based on concerns that APHIS had
ignored certain scientific information it had reviewed, reached contradictory conclusions
on related analyses, relied on explanatory information as predictive, assumed that a lack
of reported problems was evidence that problems had not occurred, used data
inconsistently, failed to consider alternate options, and failed to consider interactions
between different traits. Id.
93

John Charles Kunich, Mother Frankenstein, Doctor Nature, and the Environmental
Law of Genetic Engineering, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 807, 840 (2001).
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assessments, almost assuredly would not have run into the same difficulties
as APHIS.94
The concerns raised by the existing gaps in environmental review will
be exacerbated with next-generation biotechnology developments. In
addition to transgenic fish, the FDA, not EPA, has authority to review the
environmental impacts of transgenic farm animals modified to produce
human drugs.95 The EPA also lacks authority over the environmental and
ecological impacts of transgenic insects.96 The FDA and APHIS, not the
EPA, are the agencies that review the environmental impacts of
pharmaceutical-producing and industrial compound-producing plants.97 As
discussed above, whether APHIS has the capacity to conduct sufficient
environmental reviews is questionable. For similar reasons, it is also unclear
whether the FDA has the expertise necessary to evaluate adequately the
environmental risks posed by biotechnology.98 The FDA is not an
environmental agency and lacks expertise in critical areas concerning

94

Nevertheless, the EPA has been criticized for environmental scientific failures of its
own. See Gregory N. Mandel, Gaps, Inexperience, Inconsistencies, and Overlaps: Crisis
in the Regulation of Genetically Modified Plants and Animals, 45 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
2167, 2211-13 (2004); see also SAP Report No. 99-06, Report: FIFRA Scientific
Advisory Panel Meeting (2000), available at
http://www.epa.gov/scipoly/sap/1999/december/report.pdf (criticizing the EPA’s
nontarget insect data requirements for genetically modified pest-protected plants as being
inadequate).
95
Council on Envtl. Quality & Office of Sci. & Tech. Policy, Case Study No. IV: Farm
Animal (Goat) That Produces Human Drugs 7 (2001) [hereinafter Case Study No. IV:
Farm Animal That Produces Human Drugs], available at
http://www.ostp.gov/html/ceq_ostp_study5.pdf.
96

Animal Biotechnology, supra note 32, at 21.

97

Case Study No. III: Herbicide-Tolerant Soybean, supra note 63, at 52-53.

98

Pew Initiative on Food & Biotechnology, Future Fish: Issues in Science and Regulation
of Transgenic Fish 54-55 (2003) [hereinafter Future Fish].
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environmental impacts such as ecology and evolutionary biology.99 Even if
the FDA’s environmental assessments are adequate, it is unclear whether the
FDA possesses authority to deny certain applications on the basis of
environmental risk.100 With new biotechnological developments fast
approaching, it is imperative that these environmental gaps be closed.
2. Gaps Beyond Environmental Review
Regulatory gaps exist with respect to various agencies’ authority
beyond the concerns raised by inadequate environmental review:
·
Once APHIS grants a petition for
nonregulated status for a transgenic plant, it
no longer has any authority over the plant or
its progeny. For instance, APHIS is unable to
monitor for unexpected impacts.101
·
There is no requirement that a
manufacturer notify the FDA prior to the
commercial introduction of a new genetically
modified product.102 The FDA’s promulgation
two years ago of a proposed regulation that
would require notification recognized that this
gap was a problem.103
·
It is unclear whether any agency has
regulatory authority over transgenic animals

99

Animal Biotechnology, supra note 32, at 114-15.

100

Gregory Jaffe, Coordinated Framework: Structure Needs an Overhaul, Envtl. F.,
May/June 2002, at 24.
101
NRC 2002 Report, supra note 6, at 111, 233. In addition, if these progeny are mated
conventionally with other nonregulated transgenic plants carrying different transgenes,
the offspring also will be considered nonregulated, even though they will contain
combinations of transgenes never reviewed. These combinations could have pleiotropic
effects. Id.
102

See infra Part I.B.

103

See Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. 4706, 4709-12
(Jan. 18, 2001) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 192, 592) (proposed rule requiring
premarket notification of FDA of new genetically modified products).
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not intended for human food or to produce
human biologics.104
·
EPA lacks regulatory authority over
the growers of pest-protected plants (its
authority only extends to the producers of
such plants).105
·
Many APHIS requirements pertaining
to preventing the environmental release of
transgenic plants do not cover the release or
movement of pollen.106
· Some genetically modified plants are not
regulated on the basis that their modified trait
has been conventionally bred into plants as
well; this decision lacks scientific justification
as the genetic modification may cause
different effects than those caused by
conventional breeding.107

104

Case Study No. IV: Farm Animal That Produces Human Drugs, supra note 95, at 14.
It is possible that APHIS could exercise authority pursuant to the Animal Health
Protection Act (AHPA) of 2002, 7 U.S.C. §§ 8301-8320 (1999 & Supp. 2003), to regulate
genetically modified animals, to the extent such animals may affect the health of livestock
(in much the same manner as APHIS regulates genetically modified plants based on their
plant pest threat). APHIS authority turns on the meaning of “disease” under AHPA, a
term to be defined by the Secretary of Agriculture. Id. § 8302(3). The Secretary may be
able to define disease in such a manner as to include genetic modification of animals,
although this would not be consistent with how the Secretary has defined the term
previously, so whether such a definition would survive judicial review is not clear. See,
e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 319.59-1 (2004) (defining “disease” in another agricultural context to
include “its common meaning [and] a disease agent which incites a disease”). In
addition, the legislative history of the AHPA is quite sparse and does not indicate that
such a broad interpretation was intended.
105
Taylor & Tick, supra note 51, at 35.
106

NRC 2002 Report, supra note 6, at 109; APHIS, User’s Guide for Introducing
Genetically Engineered Plants and Microorganisms Technical Bulletin 1783 (1997)
[hereinafter APHIS, User’s Guide], available at
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/usergd.html.
107

See NRC 2002 Report, supra note 6, at 86 (arguing that the failure to regulate crops
conventionally bred to contain certain traits does not justify not regulating crops
genetically engineered to contain the same trait).
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· APHIS lacks the statutory authority to
regulate genetically modified vertebrate plant
pests and all organisms free of genetic
material from plant pests.108
A cross-agency deficiency results from agencies’ reliance on the
developer’s planned use for their transgenic product as the trigger for
regulation, as opposed to basing regulation on the actual characteristics of the
product. For example, the EPA only regulates a transgenic plant under its
pest-protected plant rules if the developer of the plant plans for it to be used
for its pesticidal effects. Thus, the EPA does not regulate a transgenic corn
variety modified to produce a known pesticide because the developer is
developing the corn for purposes other than pest resistance, in this instance
for medical diagnostic procedures (is this qualification needed?).109
Similarly, for purposes of determining whether field-testing of a transgenic
plant meets APHIS’s notification criteria, a modification is only considered
to be for a pharmaceutical use if clinical testing of the product is proposed to
the FDA.110 Thus, the developer of the product, as opposed to APHIS,
determines whether these types of transgenic plants may be prohibited from
notification approval.
Other gaps exist in APHIS’ notification and permitting processes.
APHIS regulations state that a transgenic plant is not eligible for testing or
commercialization under the notification process if the transgenes “[e]ncode
substances that are known or likely to be toxic to nontarget organisms.”111
APHIS, however, defines “toxicity to nontarget species” to apply only to

108
109

Kunich, supra note 93, at 840.
NRC 2002 Report, supra note 6, at 180.

110

See APHIS, User’s Guide, supra note 106.

111

7 C.F.R. § 340.3(b)(4)(ii) (2003).
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species that feed on the plant, not on dispersed plant parts, such as seeds,
pollen, or plant residue.112 Further, allergenicity is not one of the factors
considered in approving a notification.113 As discussed above, under the
notification process, there is no limit to the amount of genetically modified
product that can be planted or commercialized.114 It therefore would be
possible under the notification process to grow vast quantities of genetically
engineered crops that have toxic plant parts or may be allergenic.115 This
scenario appears to have occurred in at least one instance.116
Similarly, under APHIS’ permit process, APHIS can request
additional information from applicants, but cannot require the requested
information.117 This deficiency may become critical as the permit process is
expected to be the primary route for the commercial production of
pharmaceutical-producing plants.
Regulatory gaps also exist with respect to the failure to properly
inform growers regarding the proper manner for use and containment of
genetically modified crops. This failure is a root cause of the contamination
that occurred in the well-covered StarLink and ProdiGene genetically
modified food contamination scares.118 Critics also have noted it as a

112

NRC 2002 Report, supra note 6, at 180-81.

113

Id. at 181.

114

See id. at 180-81.

115

See id. at 181.

116

See id. at 180-81. This instance involves transgenic corn that produces the
glycoprotein avidin. Id. Avidin is potentially toxic to a broad array of organisms, both in
the field and after harvest. Id. The National Research Council “questions the wisdom of
allowing such plants to be grown under the streamlined notification system.” Id. at 182.
117

Id. at 110; see also 7 C.F.R. § 340.4 (2003).

118

See Mandel, supra note 94, at 2203-08, 2213-16.
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problem with regard to the proper planting of refuge areas so as to reduce the
incidence of pesticide resistance.119 Part of this deficiency stems from a
failure of agencies to exercise their full regulatory authority, and part stems
from regulators lacking authority over all entities involved in the use of
biotechnological products.
The numerous regulatory gaps identified above unnecessarily increase
the risk posed by genetically modified products. In addition, they increase the
likelihood of future high-profile transgenic product scares that could both
reduce public trust in the regulatory system and cause public opinion to
coalesce against transgenic products. In either case, this would prevent
society from harvesting the optimum benefit of such products.
B. Regulatory Inconsistencies
The Coordinated Framework in 1986 identified two primary
priorities: that the agencies regulating genetically modified products “adopt
consistent definitions” of genetically modified organisms and that the
agencies implement scientific reviews of “comparable rigor” in their
regulation of transgenic products.120 Neither priority has been met.
As a result of constraints created by primary reliance on statutes that
predate the advent of biotechnology, each of the three agencies involved in
the regulation of genetically modified products define identical regulatory
constructs differently. Pest protected plants provide an example of a
genetically modified product over which all three agencies have regulatory

119

Rebecca Bratspies, The Illusion of Care: Regulation, Uncertainty, and Genetically
Modified Food Crops, 10 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 297, 343-46 (2002) (discussing farmers’
noncompliance with refuge requirements); Gregory Jaffe, Planting Trouble: Are Farmers
Squandering Bt Corn Technology? 5-6 (2003), available at
http://www.cspinet.org/new/pdf/bt_corn_report.pdf (providing data on the number of
farms out of compliance with refuge requirements in various states).
120
Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302,
23,303 (June 26, 1986).
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authority. As Table 2 shows, each of the agencies identify the regulated
product and define the regulated substance differently.
Table 2. Inconsistent Agency Definitions of Pest-Protected Plants121
Regulated
Product
Regulated
Substance

EPA
Plant-Incorporated
protectant
Pesticidal substance
and genetic material
necessary for its
production

USDA
Plant pest, regulated
article
Organism engineered
to contain sequences
from plant pests

FDA
Food, feed, food
additive
Human food
(whole or
processed),
animal feed

With respect to the second priority, the National Research Council
has specifically noted that the data on which the EPA and APHIS base their
analyses, and the scientific stringency with which they conduct their
analyses, are not comparably rigorous.122 APHIS’s risk assessment model
may, in fact, bias it toward a finding of no significant risk.123 Thus, close to
two decades after the Coordinated Framework was established, neither of its
priorities, both of which were aimed at consistency, have been achieved.
Other substantial regulatory inconsistencies exist. Genetically
engineered pest-protected crops require premarket approval if they are
intended to be used for their pest-protection properties, in line with EPA
regulations;124 all other genetically engineered food crops do not require
premarket approval, including those crops modified to express a known

121

NRC 2000 Report, supra note 4, at 159 (the table reproduced above has been modified
to reflect changes to agency definitions since the table was originally published). The
Coordinated Framework recognized from the outset that achieving consistent definitions
would not always be possible because of statutory constraints. See, e.g., Coordinated
Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23,303 (stating that as a
result of existing law, some definitions between agencies may seem inconsistent). The
failure to achieve this goal, therefore, is not necessarily the result of a lack of effort on the
agencies’ part. It does, however, demonstrate the difficulty of promulgating consistent
regulations based on statutes enacted to handle different products.
122
See NRC 2000 Report, supra note 4, at 170-71.
123

NRC 2002 Report, supra note 6, at 98.

124

See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.

Vol. 4 [2006]

TOWARD RATIONAL REGULATION OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD

48

Gregory N. Mandel

pesticide, so long as the developer is producing the crop for another purpose,
as they are subject to the FDA’s voluntary consultation process.125 This
differentiation lacks a sound basis in science, logic, or public policy.
In another example, when APHIS granted nonregulated status to
certain genetically modified Bt crops, it did so, on the basis that EPA
regulations would adequately prevent Bt resistance from arising in plant
pests.126 APHIS, however, granted nonregulated status prior to the EPA’s
registration process, and did not follow-up to check that the EPA had
promulgated the anticipated regulations.127 Once APHIS granted
nonregulated status, manufacturers and growers had no obligation to track or
keep track of the genetically modified product, thereby limiting the EPA’s
ability to gather data and information on the impacts that APHIS expected
the EPA to prevent through regulation in the first instance.128
The regulatory inconsistencies identified in this section are irrational
and introduce substantial inefficiencies and unreasonable risks into
transgenic product regulation.129

125

See supra text accompanying notes 17-19; see also 21 C.F.R. § 170.35 (2003).

126

See Bratspies, supra note 119, at 324-25.

127

See id. at 325.
See id. at 325-26.

128
129

Instances in which agencies’ regulatory authority overlap, but the agencies have
reached different conclusions regarding the regulation of transgenic products, also
demonstrate inconsistencies. See infra Part II.D.
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C. Regulatory Inexperience
The StarLink corn contamination highlights both an example of an
agency acting outside of its area of expertise and the potentially disastrous
effects of such action. Had the EPA, or likely the FDA, been familiar with
the nation’s agricultural system, it would have recognized that it was
impossible for StarLink corn, unapproved for human consumption, to be kept
fully segregated from corn used for human food.130 This lack of knowledge
led to the most infamous transgenic food scare to date.
The numerous instances of agencies other than the EPA bearing
responsibility for environmental review also present situations in which
agencies are acting outside of their areas of expertise. These examples
include: (1) the USDA and the FDA regulating the environmental impact of
genetically modified plants other than pest-protected ones,131 (2) the FDA
regulating the environmental impact of transgenic fish and animals,132 and (3)
APHIS likely regulating the environmental impact of transgenic insects.133In
this regard, for instance, APHIS’s analysis of the likelihood of virus-resistant
genes spreading from squash to weedy relatives has been criticized for not
being well supported by scientific studies and lacking necessary data.134 In
part, these deficiencies were perceived to come about as the result of
“inadequate expertise [at APHIS] in population genetics.”135

130

See Barnaby J. Feder, Companies Act To Keep Bioengineered Corn Out of Food, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 27, 2000, at C2; Charles A. Deacon & Emilie K. Paterson, Emerging Trends
in Biotechnology Litigation, 20 Rev. Litig. 589, 614-15 (2001).

131

See supra notes 25-26, 53 and accompanying text.

132

See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.

133

See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
See NRC 2002 Report, supra note 6, at 134-35; NRC 2000 Report, supra note 4, at
122-25.
134

135

NRC 2002 Report, supra note 6, at 134.
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Lack of expertise and experience has led to other problems. In
evaluating the risk that certain genetically modified crops posed to the
Monarch butterfly, for instance, the EPA failed to fully grasp the potential
varied impact of transgenic products, and various assumptions made
concerning the threat of transgenic pollen were scientifically unsound.136
Perhaps similarly stemming from inexperience, isolation distances
required by APHIS for test plots of transgenic crops have been criticized as
not being scientifically justifiable.137 APHIS appears to have derived a
required isolation distance, intended to establish a zero tolerance for
contamination simply by doubling the isolation distance used by the USDA
in another regulatory context in which a contamination level of 0.1% was
acceptable.138 There was no evidence that doubling the isolation distance
would reduce the anticipated level of contamination from 0.1% to zero.139 As
discussed above, long distance pollen flow is poorly understood.140 Pollen
does appear to travel at least several kilometers, many times the isolation
distance at issue.141 Some have cited contamination by pollen flow as part of
the cause of the StarLink fiasco.142

136

Mandel, supra note 94, at 2212-13.

137

See NRC 2002 Report, supra note 6, at 125.

138

See id.

139

Id.

140

See id., at 66-67; NRC 2000 Report, supra note 4, at 80; Martin Teitel & Kimberly A.
Wilson, Genetically Engineered Food: Changing the Nature of Nature 38-39 (2001).
Organic farmers particularly are concerned about gene flow because the movement of
genes from genetically modified plants into organic crops could render such crops nonorganic. NRC 2000 Report, supra note 4, at 90.

141

Compare 7 C.F.R. § 201.76 (2003) (stating the required isolation distances for various
crops), with NRC 2000 Report, supra note 4, at 91 (discussing a study which found
pollen dispersed as far as three kilometers from its source). Currently proposed
regulations would increase the buffer zone for corn to between a half mile and one mile,
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These problems of regulatory inexperience and agencies acting in
areas beyond their expertise not only result in significant inefficiencies, but
also dramatically and unnecessarily increase the risk posed by genetically
modified products.
D. Regulatory Overlaps
Several types of regulatory overlap exist in the current regulatory
structure. The first overlap concerns situations in which different agencies
have authority over similar issues. For example, the EPA addresses food
safety issues associated with plants genetically modified to produce their own
pesticide,143 whereas the FDA addresses similar food safety issues for all
other genetically modified plants.144 There is no scientific rationale for this
distinction. It is the result of the historical accident of transgenic pestprotected plants falling within FIFRA’s statutory language.
Similarly, both the EPA and APHIS conduct overlapping reviews
regarding the impact of pest-protected plants on nontarget species. The EPA
studied the potential impact of Bt corn on butterflies to determine the effect
of the pesticide on nontarget species, whereas APHIS studied the potential
impact of Bt corn on butterflies to determine whether it would lead to a
reduced butterfly population.145 A reduced butterfly population was
depending on certain other factors. See supra note 72.
142

See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Seeds of Distrust: Federal Regulation of Genetically
Modified Foods, 35 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 403, 487 (2002) (“Still others claimed that they
had innocently sold elevators StarLink®-contaminated corn when the corn they planted
became cross-fertilized by StarLink® corn from neighboring fields.”).
143

See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.

144

See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.

145

See NRC 2002 Report, supra note 6, at 72-74; Council on Envtl. Quality & Office of
Sci. & Tech. Policy, Case Study No. II: Bt-Maize 32 (2001) [hereinafter Case Study No.
II: Bt-Maize], available at http://www.ostp.gov/ html/ceq_ostp_study3.pdf (presenting an
example of overlap between the EPA and APHIS); NRC 2000 Report, supra note 4, at
163-65 (concluding that there is substantial overlap in this area); see also Regulations
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considered a potential plant pest risk as it could allow greater growth of
weeds that the butterflies feed on.146 In each instance, the result is that
regulatory expertise and effort is inefficiently duplicated in multiple
agencies.
A second type of regulatory overlap occurs where multiple agencies
request the same information about the same biotechnological product, but do
not share the information. For instance, though APHIS reviews genetically
modified herbicide-tolerant plants and the EPA reviews the herbicide that
will be applied, these reviews are not coordinated.147
The worst case scenario for overlaps is for agencies to reach different
conclusions concerning the same product. Such a result has occurred. Both
APHIS and the EPA reviewed the potential for transgenic cotton to cross
with wild cotton in parts of the United States. APHIS concluded that “[n]one
of the relatives of cotton found in the United States ... show any definite
weedy tendencies.”148 EPA, conversely, found that there would be a risk of
transgenic cotton crossing with species of wild cotton in southern Florida,
southern Arizona, and Hawaii.149
Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act for Plant-Incorporated
Protectants (Formerly Plant-Pesticides), 66 Fed. Reg. 37,775 (July 19, 2001) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 152, 174) (recognizing the potential for duplicative regulation
in this area). In certain instances, it has been unclear whether APHIS was acting
independently of the EPA, possibly producing differing levels of regulatory scrutiny, or
whether APHIS lacked requisite expertise and was relying on the EPA’s determinations.
See NRC 2002 Report, supra note 6, at 157.
146

See NRC 2002 Report, supra note 6, at 72.

147

See Case Study No. III: Herbicide-Tolerant Soybean, supra note 63, at 17-18 (stating
that although APHIS and the EPA are working on coordinating efforts, currently, there
are no formal exchanges between the two agencies on this subject).

148

John H. Payne, USDA / APHIS Petition 97-013-01p for Determination of
Nonregulated Status for Events 31807 and 31808 Cotton: Environmental Assessment and
Finding of No Significant Impact (1997), available at
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/dec_docs/9701301p_ea.HTM.
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Regulatory overlap in the area of genetically modified products has
led to inefficient duplicative expertise and review as well as to conflicting
conclusions.
III. CURING REGULATORY DEFICIENCIES
The deficiencies identified above point directly to many of the
solutions that must be implemented in a new statutory and regulatory
structure for regulating genetically modified products. These solutions fall
into two broad categories: closing regulatory and statutory gaps, and
overhauling the division of regulatory responsibility.
A. Closing Regulatory and Statutory Gaps
Numerous statutory and regulatory gaps must be closed to provide an
adequate regulatory structure for genetically modified products. The most
critical gaps exist with respect to environmental protection and nextgeneration biotechnology.150 The EPA should be given statutory authority to
evaluate the environmental risk posed by genetically modified products, with
respect to transgenic fish because of the risk that escaped fish pose to native
populations.151 Transgenic insects similarly pose environmental concerns.152
Although the environmental risk posed by livestock is lower because of the
reduced risk of escape,153 the EPA still should have authority over all
genetically modified animals. The EPA also should be able to consider the
149

U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Bt Plant-Pesticides Biopesticides Registration Action
Document IIC9-IIC10 (2000), available at
http://www.epa.gov/scipoly/sap/2000/october/brad3_enviroassessment.pdf.
150

See supra Part II.A.1.

151

See Mandel, supra note 94, at 2208-11.

152

See id., at 2201.
See supra note 95.

153
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environmental impact of transgenic plants other than those modified to be
pest protected because of the risks of gene flow and invasiveness.154
Currently APHIS’ review of releases, which focuses on impacts to
agriculture, is the only review of the environmental impact of these plants.
The vast majority of this review consists of the notification process.155
Expanded EPA environmental review does not mean that industry
expenses will significantly increase, which could slow or otherwise impede
biotechnology growth. First, EPA review will likely indicate that many types
of transgenic products are not significant environmental threats and can be
handled through some sort of notification process.156 It should be the EPA
that makes this environmental determination, not an agency that lacks
environmental expertise or resources. Second, for products of greater
concern, EPA expertise should allow it to reach final determinations faster
and more predictably than the current arrangement, with concomitant
benefits for biotechnology developers.
The

second

major

gap

area,

concerning

next-generation

biotechnology, also must be addressed. Regulations governing genetically
modified animals for uses other than as human food or to produce human
biologics must be encouraged. This is particularly important, as several
animals modified to produce animal or veterinary biological products are
anticipated in the near future.157 As discussed above, the AHPA may provide

154

Examples of these types of plants would include, for example, pharmaceuticalproducing, industrial compound-producing, herbicide-tolerant, drought-tolerant, salinitytolerant, virus-resistant, temperature-tolerant, and disease-resistant plants.
155

See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.

156

See, e.g., NRC 2002 Report, supra note 6, at 83 (stating that most genetic
introductions will not pose a threat to the environment).
157

See Case Study No. IV: Farm Animal That Produces Human Drugs, supra note 95, at
14.
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APHIS with a basis for regulatory authority over such transgenic animals, but
such authority is both unclear and has not been asserted.158 Similarly,
statutory authority for and regulations governing the research and
commercialization of transgenic insects also needs to be developed. The lack
of a clear regulatory structure in these next-generation areas may impede
scientific progress.
Additional regulatory gaps must be filled within each of the three
agencies. All agencies should regulate based on the potential risks of a given
product, not based on how a developer classifies the product. APHIS should
be given authority to monitor transgenic plants after they have been granted
nonregulated status to provide for postmarket monitoring or oversight in
order to be able to detect and correct any unanticipated problems.159
The FDA should implement its 2001 proposed regulations to make
notification of the commercialization of new genetically modified food
products mandatory. Though the FDA believes it has been voluntarily
notified of all such products introduced to date,160 as the role of
biotechnology expands, not all developers will necessarily take this step.
Absent knowledge of a particular genetic modification, the FDA has no
method for monitoring whether food products have been genetically modified
or contain any genetically modified component.161
Growers of genetically modified pest-protected plants should be made
accountable to the EPA for the manner of use and containment of the

158

See supra note 74.

159

See Taylor & Tick, supra note 51, at 44 (stating that the need for postmarket oversight
is likely to change with genetic products).
160
161

See supra note 22 and accompanying text.

See Taylor & Tick, supra note 51, at 54 (stating that agencies today only respond to
specific safety concerns that arise, rather than knowing which products are genetically

Vol. 4 [2006]

TOWARD RATIONAL REGULATION OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD

56

Gregory N. Mandel

transgenic plants. Currently, only product developers are accountable to the
EPA, and grower accountability is attempted through contractual agreements
between the producer and the grower required by the EPA.162 The
contamination in the StarLink163 and ProdiGene164 cases, as well as recent
surveys of grower compliance,165 demonstrate that such informal control is
not sufficient.
Most of the other statutory and regulatory gaps identified above have
clear fixes and will not be discussed further.166 A final point with respect to
regulatory gaps should be made. Some gaps are not the result of statutory or
regulatory deficiencies but result in part from a lack of scientific knowledge.
Long-distance pollen flow is a prime example. It is a poorly understood
phenomenon, but it has a significant effect on how numerous genetically
modified crops and pharmaceutical-producing and industrial compoundproducing plants should be handled. One solution in these instances is to
create a market for the missing scientific data. If, for instance, agencies began
to require data on pollen flow in relation to regulatory approval for planting
transgenic plants under certain conditions, understanding of this critical
parameter would improve rapidly.167 Improved scientific understanding will

modified).
162
See id. at 34-36. The grower is therefore under no legal obligation to the EPA to
comply with any planting restrictions. See id.
163

See Mandel, supra note 94, at 2203-08.

164

See id. at 2213-16.

165

Jaffe, supra note 119, at 5-6 (presenting data on refuge requirement compliance
deficiencies on corn farms).
166

See supra Part II.A.

167

For example, Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act (CERCLA) liability and potential liability created a market for data on groundwater
chemistry and hydrology. See James Salzman, Valuing Ecosystem Services, 24 Ecology
L.Q. 887, 898 (1997) (reviewing Nature’s Services: Societal Dependence on Natural
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allow for more finely tuned regulation, which in turn will result in savings for
industry as it will not have to comply with regulations that are inefficiently
overprotective due to a lack of information.
B. Overhauling the Division of Regulatory Responsibility
In order to maximize the social welfare improvements provided by
genetically modified products, instances of regulatory agencies acting outside
of their areas of expertise, regulatory overlap, and inconsistent and
sometimes conflicting regulation must be remedied. All three of these
problems can be substantially ameliorated by shifting the division of
regulatory authority over genetically modified products from the current one,
based haphazardly on preexisting statutes, to a division based upon each
agency’s expertise and general mandate. Thus, the FDA should bear
responsibility for the human health risks posed by genetically modified plants
or animals intended for use as human food or pharmaceuticals; the EPA
should take responsibility for evaluating the environmental risks posed by
transgenic products; and the USDA should regulate the impact of genetically
engineered products on agricultural crops and livestock.
This division of regulatory authority not only is inherently logical, but
provides the added benefits of increased efficiency, greater human health and
environmental protection, and economic savings. Placing regulatory
authority for particular risks in the hands of the agency with the most
expertise, experience, and relevant resources will best guarantee that the risk
Ecosystems (Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997)). Wetlands regulations created a market for
data on wetlands vegetation and hydrology. Id. Both of these needs led to a much better
understanding of the respective scientific issues.
Requiring industry to provide scientific information raises concerns about
potential industry bias in the reporting of data. The experience with hazardous and toxic
waste site clean-up, wetlands protection, endangered species surveys, and other types of
environmental assessment requirements has demonstrated that regulatory agency review
of industry-provided data can help to ensure accuracy and lead to greater scientific
knowledge in the long run. See id. (discussing the improvement in the understanding of
scientific matters due to CERCLA and wetlands regulation).
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is properly evaluated and protected against. It will do so as quickly and
inexpensively as possible. Such action also will clear up instances of
regulatory inconsistency and overlap because a given risk will only be
evaluated by a single agency.
One concern with such a solution may be that a single transgenic
product could be regulated by multiple agencies if it presents multiple types
of risks; that is, there will be certain types of overlap even under the
proposed changes to the regulatory system. Because genetically modified
products raise varied types of risk, it is inevitable that there will be some
overlap in agency responsibility under any regulatory system. The nature of
legislation and regulation themselves necessarily create overlaps and gaps, as
well as over-regulation and under-regulation. Legislation and regulation
require the categorization of problems or concerns in some manner.
Inevitably certain issues will arise that do not fit neatly into the regulatory
boxes created. Where these issues fall through the cracks, there will be a
regulatory gap; where they fall within multiple boxes, there will be
regulatory overlap. For efficiency and economic purposes, one goal of
regulation should be to minimize these regulatory problems, while still
maintaining adequate protection. The proposals provided here seek to
minimize regulatory gaps and greatly reduce the existing amount of
regulatory overlap.
In addition, the expense of any overlap that results from this proposal
can be reduced by requiring the agencies to coordinate their actions; for
instance, by designating a lead agency based on the most significant risk and
requiring only a single developer submission covering all pertinent
information for a given product. Under the existing regulatory system, a lead
agency is usually, but not always, designated for transgenic products that fall
within multiple agencies’ authority. Such designation, however, is not
58

Vol. 4 [2006]

SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
www.scu.edu/scjil

59

necessarily based on the type of risk presented and generally has not resulted
in coordinated information submission requirements.168 For instance, both the
EPA and the USDA require similar information submissions on pestprotected plants.
The requirements proposed here also would force better
communication among the various agencies, a problem that has plagued
biotechnology regulation since its inception,169 with increased efficiency for
industry and savings for taxpayers. Most importantly, placing responsibility
for a given risk with the agency best equipped to regulate it removes the cost
of paying for unnecessary duplicative areas of expertise in multiple agencies,
significantly reducing the expense of regulation.
It is worth noting that in most areas of regulation in the United States,
the agency that has regulatory authority over a given product is usually the
agency with the most expertise in handling the type of risk presented by the
product. Genetically modified product regulation, however, is a product of
the historical accident of transgenic products being squeezed into statutory
definitions not intended for them. Shifting regulatory authority to a riskbased approach will eradicate numerous inefficiencies and minimize risks to
consumers and society.

168

See Wilson Huhn, Three Legal Frameworks for Regulating Genetic Technology, 19 J.
Contemp. Health L. & Pol’y, 1, 29 (2002) (“Despite its name, the [Coordinated
Framework] has often lacked coordination.”).
169

See, e.g., Recommendations and Statement of the Administrative Conference
Regarding Administrative Practice and Procedure, 54 Fed. Reg. 53,493 (Dec. 29, 1989)
(recommending numerous steps to improve interagency coordination in the regulation of
biotechnology); Case Study No. III: Herbicide-Tolerant Soybean, supra note 63, at 17-18
(noting that the EPA and APHIS have not coordinated herbicide-tolerant plant review);
NRC 2000 Report, supra note 4, at 16 (recommending improving interagency
coordination in the regulation of biotechnology).

